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Abstract 
Modern game scholarship in the past two decades has known two 
dominant, yet paradoxical, tendencies in theorizing the subject of play: 
an interpellationary account and a deconstructivist one. Going from 
Miguel Sicart’s concept of the ethical player as an initial compromise 
between the two, this article argues for an ideological subject of play 
that is a split subject. Aside from phenomenological presense through 
‘playing subjects,’ as Foucaultian subjects constructed by the governing 
structure of rules, we must recognize the parallel subjectivity of ‘played 
subjects,’ inherent to – and narrativized by – the game as avatars, 
visual narrators or sheer content. In this constellation, the player 
appears to have a merely precarious position over the played, ready to 
lose control at the whim of the game. 
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Deconstruction  
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“I don’t understand. How on earth are you 
making meaningful choices? What did you—–wait 
a second. Did I just see, no that’s not possible. I 
can’t believe it. How had I not noticed it sooner? 
You’re not Stanley. You’re a real person!” 
– Narrator (The Stanley Parable, Galactic Café, 2013) 
 
When the narrator of The Stanley Parable realizes that the plot he was 
laboriously narrating was all this time acted out by a human player 
behind a computer, he is suitably astonished. After all, digital games 
may depend on an audience able to act – but that player’s actions are 
still limited by script. Why, then, can it seem even remotely astonishing 
that The Stanley Parable reflects on this lack of freedom? I propose that 
this is because of a fundamental tension in participatory media that 
games often wilfully ignore: while the promise of interactivity may be a 
promise of freedom, even the briefest contemplation shows us that the 
explorable options making up this freedom are limited and, perhaps 
more disillusioning, pre-programmed. Yet, grammatically speaking, 
games seem to be particularly first-person experiences. I might take 
pride in completing a game, or gravely remember difficult moments of 
leading protagonists to victory. But who is that I, and to what extent can 
I be, at once, the person playing a game as well as embodying an 
avatar? How is this subject split across game and play and how do these 
subjectivities relate? In order to define the I of the digital game-playing 
subject, I ask: 
What type of subject is constructed through the structures of 
digital game-play? 
After a short introduction of my case study, providing a context and 
frame of reference for my research question, I will start by reiterating 
two traditions through which the gaming subject has frequently been 
theorized: an interpellationary and a deconstructivist model. Second, I 
will look at Miguel Sicart’s attempt at bridging these two positions by 
describing a player-subject in a Foucaultian model of power relations 
that articulates how the game-as-structure brings into being a specific 
player-subject. I will, however, problematize Sicart’s concept of the 
‘player-subject’ as a unified, stable subject separate from the ‘playing’ 
self. My case study will serve partly as a counter-example, as The 
Stanley Parable thematizes reflection to address the difference between 
the playing subject and the avatar through which the player is present 
within the diegesis of the game. Finally, departing from Sicart’s player-
subject I will re-define the split subject of digital game-play on the basis 
of the phenomenological concept of ‘presence,’ which accounts for the 
continuum of difference between our natural selves and the embodiment 
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of avatars. The discussion involved, however, first requires the context 
of twenty years of game studies research.  
Interpellation versus Deconstruction 
Writing in 1995, media scholar Ted Friedman is early to recognize a 
tendency among critics to understand the limitations of choice in digital 
games as paradigmatic for ideology. Even in the case of freely 
explorable environments and branching choices, “a hypertext model of 
‘interactive cinema’ still does little to give the player a sense of real 
autonomy,” indeed “the choices remain a limited set of pre-defined 
options” (1995, p. 79). The problem is not so much that we should 
expect games to be ‘objective’ or ‘free from bias’ as Friedman puts it – 
after all, “computer programs, like all texts, will always be ideological 
constructions” (p. 81). The fear of those other critics is rather that the 
illusion of freedom promised by interactivity serves to veil the ideology 
of the program.  
While Friedman cites columnist Jerry Pournelle, many other authors 
have followed comparable lines of reasoning. Media scholar Eggo Müller 
exemplifies this reasoning – while not, eventually, endorsing it – by 
summarizing it as such: 
…whereas the 'passive' viewer has the freedom to negotiate or 
resist the ideology of a program (as described in active audience 
theory), the interactive participant necessarily affirms the 
program's ideological stance. (Müller, 2009, p. 53) 
By going along with the proposed behaviour of the system, by following 
the rules of the game, the naive player-subject necessarily follows the 
system’s proposed world view, or so the argument goes. Marxist 
academics Nick Dyer-Witheford and Greig de Peuter go so far as to say 
that interactivity “[rather] intensifies the sense of free will necessary for 
ideology to work really well. Players, of their own choice, rehearse 
socially stipulated subjectivities” (2009, p. 192). 
We may recognize, in this line of reasoning, a presumed merger of the 
player and the diegetic character into a single, stable subject. 
Completely caught up in the illusion of agency, players lose themselves 
in the game-proposed roles as “consumer, commander, commanded, 
cyborg, criminal” and other such “subject positions” (ibid.). The process 
of this identification is theorized by Dyer-Witheford through Marxist 
philosopher Louis Althusser’s process of interpellation, a calling (or 
hailing) into being of subjectivities through social practices. Any 
individual or collective idea of who we are is, according to Althusser’s 
theoretical framework, a consequence of adopting, through material 
practice (Althusser 1969, p. 696) – in this case playing a digital game – 
“the subject position proposed for us by [societal] discourse” (Fiske, 
1987, p. 53). 
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The reasoning is certainly appealing, but it is problematized by various 
factors. First – as mentioned above – it assumes a ‘naive’ player that is 
completely caught up in the illusion of the fictional role. In other words, 
the presumed merger of player and character disregards a cynical 
engagement with the game: aware of the propagandist agenda behind 
recruitment game America’s Army, I am perfectly able to play for fun 
without being truly hailed as (American) soldier. Second, the type of 
“feedback loop between user and computer” that Friedman also 
recognized (1995, p. 73) is problematized by what media scholar Diane 
Carr recognizes as the dynamicity of digital games: 
...if interpellation does happen during play, there is no reason to 
assume that the potential interpellations posed by these various 
systems would be cumulative. It seems just as likely that they 
might clash, or that they would be mutually affirming one 
moment but contradictory the next. For this reason an account of 
ideology in games that relied on a static model of interpellation 
would be unsatisfactory. (Carr, 2007) 
Similarly, Carr suggests the subject position offered to the player-
subject to be dynamic, “activated or dormant, taken up, dropped or 
ignored by a player from moment to moment,” a position that 
fundamentally clashes with Dyer-Witheford and de Peuter’s assumption 
of the stable, ready-made roles that digital games offer for us to adopt.  
We encounter a final problem to an interpellational model of digital play 
when returning to Friedman, who suggests that “the process of 
computer game playing” is exactly a revealing of “the inner 
relationships” of the simulation (1995, p. 82). In other words, “learning 
and winning […] a computer game is a process of demystification: one 
succeeds by discovering how the software is put together” (ibid.). We 
find this school of thought continued in the work of psychologist Sherry 
Turkle (acknowledging the possibility for “simulation understanding,” or, 
alternatively, “resignation” to and “rejection” of its underlying 
assumptions [1996, p. 71]); Ian Bogost (coining ‘procedural literacy’ as 
a similar process of recognizing the rhetorical gestures of simulations’ 
processes [2007, p. 258]); and, notably, play scholar Joost Raessens, 
who aligns Friedman’s demystification and similar processes of 
recognizing digital games’ assumptions with Jacques Derrida’s method 
of déconstruction:  
...the method of interpretation that aims to bring to the 
foreground those elements that operate under the surface, but 
break through cracks in the text to disrupt its superficial 
functioning. (Raessens, 2005, p. 376) 
While, on one hand, then, an interpellational model of gameplay 
assumes that players are ‘hailed’ completely into the subject position 
offered by immersive games; a deconstructivist model proposes that 
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players are wholly detached critics that deconstruct games’ systems as a 
quintessential way of engaging with and understanding them. As with 
every simplification of academic debate, these positions are necessarily 
exaggerated, but I take them to be representative of two wholly 
alternative ways of theorizing the player-subject that make far-reaching 
assumptions about the distinction between players and the fictional 
worlds they interact with. 
Games as Power Structures 
The point of friction between these two models is their choice of 
emphasis. An interpellational model, as seen above, assumes the 
ideological-paradigmatic role of an ideal player, subsumed under the 
game as a ludic structure, and emphasizes this governing structure as 
one guiding the player uncritically through a finite number of pre-
programmed choices. The deconstructivist model emphasizes, instead, a 
detached player-subject acting as a type of Derridean reader,1 i.e. 
unearthing the game’s underlying rules as an object of analysis in order 
to interact with those rules (i.e. to play) successfully. 
Rather than being mutually exclusive, the ideological-paradigmatic 
game-as-structure and the deconstructing player-as-subject are in a 
dialectical relationship, producing what Miguel Sicart terms the ‘player-
subject’ within the game. Sicart argues that it is the relation between 
game and player that produces the player-subject. Although Sicart’s 
interest lies mainly in articulating an ethical rather than an ideological 
player-subject, the way in which he does so is productive to answering 
my question. Sicart connects the game-as-object – as set of rules – to 
the player-subject by viewing the former as a power structure in a 
Foucaultian sense. Much like the way in which power structures are 
prerequisites for the subject, he argues, “the game as an object is a 
prerequisite for the being of the player” (2009, p. 67). 
Sicart’s player-subject is characterized by three properties which I will 
treat below, the last two of which I will problematize. First, as 
mentioned, Sicart’s player-subject is produced in a process of voluntary 
subjectivization akin to Foucaultian power structures. This theoretical 
framework addresses the relationship between the game-as-structure 
and the player-subject, as well as providing a productive way of thinking 
the phenomenology of digital play as adopting and experiencing a 
temporary subjectivity. A second property of Sicart’s player-subject is its 
status as a ‘skin-subject,’ whose relationship is unclear to other 
subjectivities – specifically to subjecthood outside of the game. This is 
related to the third property of Sicart’s player-subject, which is its 
prerequisite of ‘immersion,’ a problematic term in the field of game 
studies that Sicart does not directly define. 
                                           
1 After Jacques Derrida, on whose method of déconstruction (cf. Derrida, 
1967) Joost Raessens bases the term for his deconstructing player, as 
indicated above. 
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“Playing a computer game,” for Sicart, “is an act of subjectivization, a 
process that creates a subject connected to the rules of the game” (p. 
63). He uses the term subject in both Michel Foucault’s meanings of the 
word: as “subject to someone else by control and dependence, and tied 
to his own identity by a conscience or self-knowledge” (Foucault, 2001, 
p. 331). How does this subjectivization process work in the context of 
digital games? 
Once a player figures out the rules of a game, they know what their 
“actions in the game were supposed to be,” allowing them to act on that 
knowledge (Sicart, 2009, p. 65). That is: playing involves acknowledging 
and obeying its rules. Sicart consequently argues “that when a player is 
immersed in this system, her behaviour is shaped by the game system, 
its rules and mechanics” (p. 66). Inferred knowledge on that system 
produces the power relation that generates the subject’s behaviour. This 
approach differs from the interpellational model above only in that the 
relation of the diegetic player-subject (while still undifferentiated from 
the played character) to the player as “a cultural and moral being” 
outside of the game is voluntary (p. 63). Player-subjects arise as 
conceptual test-cases: possibilities for players to perform other 
subjectivities. 
Two reasons why Sicart uses Foucault in order to provide a framework 
to describe the relation between the player and the game are, first, that 
power and power structures for Foucault are not necessarily subject to 
negative or positive value statements, they merely exist; and, second, 
that “power structures are prerequisites for the subject” (p. 67). For 
Foucault, power structures are enacted not so much in “such-or-such 
institution of power, or group, or elite, or class:” it is rather a technique 
or form (2001, p. 331). This “form of power […] categorizes the 
individual, marks him by his own individuality, attaches him to his own 
identity,” making the individual into a subject (ibid.).  
In “the Subject and Power,” Foucault foregrounds the question of ‘how’ 
power is exercised in order to de-emphasize “questions of ‘what’ and 
‘why’” (p. 337). Power “brings into play relations between individuals,” 
and it is in these power relations (“and not power itself” [p. 339]) that 
subjects are acted upon. Instead of “global, massive or diffused” power 
as entity, it is something exercised (put into action) on another: a power 
relation can only be articulated on the basis of an ‘other’ “recognized 
and maintained to the very end as a subject who acts” (p. 340).  
In the case of a player maintained as a subject capable of action within 
the set of rules offered up by the game, that power relation rests on the 
instrument of consent. On the basis of this instrumental role of consent, 
Sicart argues for the necessity of recognizing the voluntary nature of 
player-subjectivity – indeed, “the exercise of power can never do 
without [violence or consent], often both at the same time” (Foucault, 
2001, pp. 340-41). I would like to additionally draw attention to 
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Foucault’s use of the words ‘conduct’ (playing on (se) conduire, to 
lead/drive; as well as to conduct oneself, to behave) and ‘government,’ 
in the way that a political structure can govern as well as in the way “in 
which the conduct of individuals or of groups might be directed” (p. 
341). A way to envision how games can function as rulesets generative 
of subjects is by thinking of them as governing or conducting those 
player-subjects, which “is to structure the possible field of action of 
others” (ibid.). Rather than violence (which I consider irrelevant to most 
cases of digital play) or voluntary contracts (which Sicart takes as 
defining in the case of digital play [2009, p. 68]), it is government that 
Foucault considers “the relationship proper to power” (Foucault, 2001, p. 
341).  
As a type of freely adopted governing institution, then, the power 
structure of a game’s rules ‘produces’ a player-subject: “the game’s 
ontological nature initially defines the ontological position of its subjects, 
the players, [in that it] establishes the starting point for the process of 
subjectivization that takes place in the act of playing a game” (p. 68). 
The ‘ontological nature’ of a game is, for Sicart “as a system of rules 
that create and are experienced through game worlds” (p. 47). Yet how 
does a system of rules produce a subject and define its initial ontological 
position? 
Sicart approaches games as events akin to Badiou’s événement: “an act 
of absolute truth that shatters the established knowledge” and, 
additionally, “an experience of delimited boundaries with a series of 
imperatives that have to be assumed in order to become a subject” 
(Sicart, 2009, p. 71). Thus, “faithful to those principles [the series of 
imperatives], the player as subject is created” (ibid.). To Sicart, this 
eclectic combination of Badiou and Foucault shapes a player-subject that 
is necessarily faithful to the game’s experience. As such, “games as 
objects can condition what the ethical practices and values of the 
players will be through their affordances and constraints” (p. 102). 
There are some problems with this process. The player-subject for Sicart 
is generated in a power structure, created as “a subset of our being as 
multiple subject” (p. 73). But this subjecthood, particular to each game, 
assumes a faithfulness to the governing principles in order to be. It ends 
when the player stops playing or does not abide to the principles of play 
– in Sicart’s terms, when it does not show fidelity to the game’s 
“affordances and constraints” (p. 102). In fact, “not being faithful to the 
rules implies not being faithful to the event, and therefore losing the 
ontological status of subject” for Sicart (p. 71). In his example, to stop 
playing a game like Custer’s Revenge (Mystique, 1982), which features 
rape as its primary goal, is to “immediately suspend the player-
subjectivity” and revert to one’s “own personal and cultural values” (p. 
103, emphasis added). The example is one that rejects a moral 
perversion: the player-subject, which we might remember as a subset of 
“our being as multiple subject” (p. 73), is rejected by “[the] cultural and 
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moral being” (p. 63) of which it is a subset. There is, for Sicart, an 
implicit super-subject: one’s ‘own’ subject as an autonomous individual 
playing the game – made up of a set of personal and cultural values – 
that is, to Sicart, outside of the push and pull of power relations. 
Granted, there is a certain porosity between Sicart’s player-subject, 
generated by the power structure of the game, and the cultural and 
moral being of which it is a subset, but it is a one-way exchange. The 
subject that is playing the game informs the player-subject, in order to 
better “deduce the rules” of the structure players are subjects of (p. 
69). Elsewhere, Sicart redefines the “larger cultural being” of which the 
“player-subject is only a subset” as an agent “bringing [experience] into 
the game” (p. 77). Their relation is further ill-defined: the player-subject 
is merely a “skin-subject in contact with the world outside the game, 
which in return does have influence over how a player experiences a 
certain game” (p. 102).  
Sicart uses the metaphor of the skin for the player-subject as a 
temporarily adopted virtual skin “that is both ‘oneself’ and ‘other,’ 
because it has a component of strangeness that puts the player in 
contact with the virtual world” (p. 78). As such, playing becomes 
“putting on the player-skin and experiencing the world and the game 
world within it” (p. 79). The metaphor of the skin “connects the internal, 
individual subjectivity of the player with the larger communitarian, 
cultural and historical subjectivities of the contemporary self” (ibid.).  
Furthermore, Sicart’s player-subject depends on the metaphor of 
immersion: only “when a player is immersed in this system, her 
behaviour is shaped by the game system” (p. 66); and it is “the fact 
that the player is immersed in a ludic experience that creates the play-
subject” (p. 98). This metaphor was introduced by game scholar Janet 
Murray in 1997, “derived from the physical experience of being 
submerged in water” (p. 98). It has been a trope in game studies since, 
but the metaphor has ‘run wild’ in a sense, extending, among other 
things, to a “psychological immers[ion]” (ibid.) that finds echoes in later 
broad uses as a type of emotional investment (Gerrig, 1998), any 
cognitive appropriation of a mental challenge (Björk and Holopainen 
2005), a “suspension of disbelief,” a “cerebral kind of involvement with 
the game” or a “meditation-like state–the Tetris trance” (Adams, 2004).  
It is at least confusing that Sicart does not define immersion, extending 
it even to involvement with the cultural community of players (2009, p. 
102). Especially considering how central immersion is as a prerequisite 
for the player-subject, it is difficult to see how the subjectivity offered 
by a digital game can be formulated as a phenomenological being, as a 
double existence of the body ‘immersed,’ or  “tak[ing] place in the world 
of experiences both passively and actively” (p. 78). Sicart draws from 
philosopher Barbara Becker’s understanding of the body-subject as 
“simultaneously an external being that can be experienced and an 
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internal being that experiences other […] somewhere between a 
material object and a pure consciousness” (Becker, 2000, p. 363). He 
translates this body-subject into the player-subject by claiming that it 
“present[s] some qualities of embodiment,” but he does not argue which 
and why. Sicart names the “complex and highly detailed process of 
avatar creation” in some games a “symptom of this fact,” but not until 
game scholar Teun Dubbelman’s dissertation, Narratives of Being There 
(2013), is the phenomenological turn in player subjectivity adequately 
argued. 
What Sicart leaves us with is a relation between the game-as-structure 
and the player-as-subject wherein the game’s formal set of rules 
governs the behaviour and ontology of a ‘player-subject’ through a 
process similar to Foucault’s power relations. That concept of the player-
subject is, however, unclearly based on the experience of immersion, an 
experience that is furthermore ill-defined in its relation to the player as 
a subject outside of the game – sometimes as another “subset of our 
being as multiple subject” (p. 73), other times as a “larger cultural 
being,” (p. 77). 
Stanley Decides for Himself Now 
I would like to introduce, here, the case study of subjecthood in The 
Stanley Parable, since it provides a valuable reflection on Sicart’s player-
subject. Calling itself a Parable already implies some didactic nature: 
indeed the original release in 2007 (Galactic Café) was frequently 
described by its designers as “an experimental narrative-driven first 
person game […] an exploration of choice, freedom, storytelling and 
reality, all examined through the lens of what it means to play a video 
game” (Mod Db, 2011).2 The game, then, perhaps more than wanting to 
entertain, serves a critical purpose. 
The Stanley Parable thematically foregrounds governance: the character 
Stanley is introduced as someone guided by orders, pushing buttons in 
servitude, and the player is ostensibly expected to do the same. Stanley 
epitomizes the first sense of Foucault’s subject as someone “subject to 
someone else by control and dependence” (2001, p. 331), following 
each order, experiencing dread when the power relationship is 
suspended. Whereas before, “Stanley relished every moment that the 
orders came in, as though he had been made exactly for this job,” 
suddenly “something very peculiar happened. Something that would 
forever change Stanley” (Galactic Café, 2013): 
‘He had been at his desk for nearly an hour when he realized that 
not one single order had arrived on the monitor for him to follow. 
                                           
2 NB: Unless specifically mentioned, I shall be referring to the more 
recent and extensive release of The Stanley Parable (Galactic Café, 
2013) rather than the first game with the same title (Galactic Café, 
2007). 
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No-one had shown up to give him instructions […] Something 
was very clearly wrong. Shocked, frozen solid, Stanley found 
himself unable to move for the longest time. But as he came to 
his wits and regained his senses, he got up from his desk and 
stepped out of his office.’ (ibid.) 
At this point, the fictional subject Stanley ends, and the disembodied 
representation of Stanley – seen as an other, represented in a there-
and-then, the way we see actors in film – turns into an embodied 
presentation: players take Stanley’s perspective and control him in the 
here-and-now. As those last words of narration are heard, we have little 
choice but to follow those orders ourselves – that is, to subject 
ourselves to the same power relationship with the narration (as an 
aspect of the game’s design) that Stanley was in. When I say “we have 
little choice” that means we have some choices: we may choose to 
stand around in office 427 and possibly look around; we may choose to 
quit the game; or we may choose to follow the narration. 
Quitting the game at this point, refusing to play, suspends the ‘player-
subject’ of The Stanley Parable. Refusing what philosopher Bernard Suits 
calls the “lusory attitude,” the playful attitude to submit to “games [as] 
rule-governed activities,” means that “it is not possible to play a game” 
(1978, p. 35). Alternatively, the term ludic contract is employed as an 
agreement, similar to Suits’ lusory attitude, “on the part of players that 
they will forgo some of their agency in order to experience an activity 
that they enjoy;” which is, according to game design scholar Charles J. 
Pratt, a case of “adopting an ideology more than a set of abstract rules” 
(2010). Pratt’s example is that of Bioshock (2K Games, 2007), whose 
ludic contract Clint Hocking describes as “seek power and you will 
progress” (2007, p. 256). To refuse that ideology is to refuse the ludic 
contract, is not to play. In other words, not playing means refusing the 
‘initial ontological position’ of the ‘player-subject’ for Sicart (2009, p. 
69).  
If we do allow the player-subject to be created by submitting to the 
rules of the game, The Stanley Parable’s branching narrative forces us 
to acknowledge a difference between the ‘skin’ we are adopting (i.e. that 
of Stanley) and ourselves as controllers of that skin. This problematizes 
Sicart’s skin-subject as entirely subsumed under the ‘multiple subject’ of 
the player: characters like Stanley have a determinate background 
story, a gender, a visual representation and so on. Even in a game such 
as the Parable where all the choices are made by a player who does not 
relinquish this control, there is a split between the character played and 
the subject playing. The Stanley Parable plays on this, for example when 
suggesting the player quit the game in order to save Stanley from dying 
in a large crushing machine; or when acknowledging, as cited in the 
introductory citation, that Stanley is someone fundamentally different 
from the player, “a real person” (2013). This rhetoric is underlined 
visually in one of the game’s endings, possible after another ending has 
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been completed first. Reaching the area with the two doors again, the 
player will ‘leave’ Stanley both in terms of control and of perspective – 
leaving him ungoverned and motionless (Figure ). As the credits roll, 
the narrator worries about Stanley’s inability to act, unable to decide for 
himself. 
 
Figure 1. Third person (The Stanley Parable, Galactic Café, 2013) 
Subjects of Presence 
Leaving Stanley behind, as a skin or avatar previously inhabited, 
stresses the changeable nature of players’ presence in games. In order 
to address this presence, I turn from Sicart to Dubbelman, doing so for 
two reasons. First of all, I turn to Dubbelman’s concept of presence 
because it allows me to theorize more elaborately how different 
configurations of (dis)embodied presence connect what Sicart called the 
diegetic player-subject to the ‘every-day’ experience of the playing 
subject outside of the game. In other words, through presence I am 
able to describe the distinction between digital games’ ‘Stanley’ and 
myself as a player behind the keyboard. A second reason is that a clear 
definition of presence replaces the overdetermined term ‘immersion’ as 
a way for “media users to feel physically present in the stories and 
fictional worlds expressed” (2013, p. 227).  
I will start out by defining presence as a crucial term necessary to 
describe the connection between a playing subject and the game. After 
that, I will argue that the concept of presence sheds light on the 
difference between player and character as a variable identification that 
differs across genres and moments of play. To do this, I shall trace how 
presence accounts for the continuum of difference between our natural 
‘selves’ and our avatars; second, I shall look at ways in which formal 
game design elements may affect this difference between the two. 
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Presence is “the feeling or fact of being present to something” (p. 2). 
Mediated presence is of course in need of some elaboration. An intuitive, 
but admittedly narrow, example of mediated presence would be that of 
virtual reality environments: consider the stereoscopic virtual reality 
headset Oculus Rift, currently in development, which early testers report 
grants “spatial perception – the fact that you are in a space where there 
is depth” (EDGE, 2014, p. 73). Such a narrow idea of presence is based 
on what Dubbelman calls a ‘logic of mimesis:’ “the idea that spatial 
presence in essence derives from the illusion of non-mediation,” (p. 25). 
Dubbelman’s phenomenological – rather than mimetic – approach to 
presence allows a recognition of mediated presence that deviates from 
natural perception (p. 27). Phenomenological media theory ‘externalizes 
perception,’ by stating that “our perceptual mechanism does not reside 
in the [embodied mind] but somewhere in-between our [embodied 
mind] and our environment” (p. 33). Central is the concept of 
intentionality, making perceived phenomena (including the perception of 
mediated presence) “a shared construct of our perceptual faculties and 
an object towards which our perceptual faculties are intentionally 
directed,” regardless of whether that object is ‘real’ or imaginary; 
everyday or unmediated (ibid.). Hence, media expand natural 
perception by my directing attention to it in order to perceive, leading 
media psychologists Wijnand IJsselsteijn and Giuseppe Riva to remark 
that, “as a user experience, the feeling of ‘being there,’ or presence, is 
not intrinsically bound to any specific technology–it is a product of the 
mind” (2003, p. 5). 
Rather than degrees of presence – more or less resembling the ‘natural’ 
perception of everyday life – this phenomenological approach leads 
Dubbelman to formulate unhierarchized different forms of presence, in 
that “Media stimulate and enhance our bodily senses in particular ways 
[making] us see, hear, smell, taste, touch, and position in ways 
impossible without the intervention of these media” (Dubbelman, 2013, 
p. 47). As a consequence,  
‘...it becomes ‘natural’ to us to temporarily engage the perceived 
world in another manner. In short, media produce […] different 
ways of perceiving the world around us and our own position in 
it: other ways of being-in-the-world, to use phenomenological 
terminology.’ (ibid.) 
An example that, for me, underlines the delimiting nature of perception 
as a ‘being-in-the-world’ is Deleuze’s description of the perceptual world 
of ticks. In Parnet’s interviews L'Abécédaire de Gilles Deleuze he relates 
an impression of the perceptional world of ticks: from a forest full of life 
it extracts only simple sensations of light, smell and touch that shape its 
world (1996) – would a simulation of a tick’s life not be perfectly 
suitable as a digital game experience? A tick climbs the tree, waits for 
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the light to change, smells the victim, drops, feels the victim, latches 
onto it. Mission complete.3 
The reason I find Dubbelman’s use of the phenomenological concept of 
mediated presence furthermore preferable to definitions of immersion in 
the case of digital games is because it bypasses the binary difference 
between immersion and distantiation that is so necessary to uphold a 
difference between purely interpellational and deconstructivist models of 
gameplay. One can be absolutely convinced of the fictional world yet not 
be present; just as one can be present in the game but distantiated 
from its events. For example, one can be immersed in Tolkien’s Middle 
Earth, but nonetheless lack presence while reading The Fellowship of the 
Ring (1954); just as one may feel distantiated from the goings on in 
SimCity (1989), yet be variably present – relating, acting and 
overseeing – in the world as disembodied mayor, city planner, real 
estate developer and so on. Secondly, I prefer the use of presence, in 
this case, because of its specific phenomenological account of digital 
play: the ability of digital games to render players experientially 
present, “anchored to one location in space and time” (p. 227). Whereas 
a cinematic or literary world is witnessed, digital games allow players to 
experience a fictional world as part of it. Using a theatrical analogy, 
digital games grant us the unique ability not just to be on stage, but to 
wander around the scenery and freely interact with its actors. 
Importantly, Dubbelman distinguishes between embodied and 
disembodied presence: where the former is ‘prosthetic’ as if it were an 
artificial extension of the body, the latter gives players control over an 
external body of an ‘other’ (p. 126). Hence the difference between an 
avatar as “an external object to look at” versus “an embodied position to 
look from” (p. 103) – the ‘skin’ as object and the ‘skin-subject’ playing, 
respectively. An intuitive example is that of camera use, where “the 
first-person camera allows the player to think of the avatar as ‘me,’” as 
opposed to the third-person camera’s ‘him’ or ‘her’ (p. 99). I may think 
of playing, again, America’s Army, in terms of myself enacting the role 
of American soldier, whereas the experience of playing Spec Ops: the 
Line or The Stanley Parable entails controlling Capt. Martin Walker or 
Stanley: the third person camera establishes Stanley as an ‘other’. As I 
will argue below, game design elements (such as camera placement or 
an elaborate backstory for the avatar you are controlling) may create a 
certain disidentification – or, in terms of presence, a reduction of the 
impression that players themselves are physically present in the fictional 
world as ‘player-subject’. 
                                           
3 A similar game concept has been released under the name Mister 
Mosquito for PlayStation 2 (ZOOM Inc., 2002), in which the player flies 
around the room as a mosquito, keeping track of the amount of blood 
sucked from its victim and its amount of stress. Arguably, the player’s 
perception is limited to those senses: sight, blood level and stress level. 
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The avatar, then, has a “double status” as both prosthetic point-of-view 
and external controlled object, allowing it to either “mimic [or] defer 
from ‘natural’ embodiment,” (p. 103) similar to Becker’s body-subject. 
But this closeness or distance to everyday experience and personhood is 
variable and, for Dubbelman and those scholars his research is based 
on, furthermore a matter of design. What this adds, first and foremost, 
onto ontological claims of what games are (as power structures) or how 
players become subjects through them (by accepting games’ 
affordances and constraints) is a terminology by which to indicate those 
formal properties of games by which the player ‘acts’ the character. 
Furthermore, it indicates a spectrum of identification that brings further 
into focus the continuum of difference between the interpreting subject 
outside of the game, the playing subject controlling the avatar and the 
played avatar represented: 
‘Computer games design the relationship between the player 
[and the] avatar in various ways. At one end of the spectrum, we 
find the subjective avatar of embodied presence (i.e. the avatar 
as anchored location to look from), while at the other end, we 
find the objective avatar of disembodied presence (i.e. the avatar 
as external object to look at).’ (Dubbelman, 2013, p. 104) 
Besides a critical reworking of phenomenological Presence Theory for 
participatory media, Dubbelman does a thorough job of addressing 
some of the different game design configurations that may produce and 
affect presence. For instance, a ‘dual-locus’ configuration splits the 
played subject across two [duo] places [loci]. One of these played 
subjects being an objective avatar (such as Stanley) that is controlled in 
order to navigate the world and interact with other objects and 
characters. Another being the visual-perceptual subject-position through 
which the player beholds (from a disembodied position hovering freely 
around) their avatar as a played (in the sense of ‘controlled’) object in 
the world (pp. 110-13).  
This specific configuration is elucidative as it lies between the poles of 
first-person and third-person configurations. Straightforwardly embodied 
first-person configuration entails a full correspondence between the 
place and orientation of the player with that of the character as in 
natural perception, as in first-person games such as The Stanley Parable 
or America’s Army. Conversely, in the entirely disconnected third-person 
configuration, players’ orientation and place are fully segregated and the 
player lacks control over one or both of these, as in the case of any cut-
scenes, 4 quick-time events,5 or, more concretely, Heavy Rain’s 
                                           
4 Cut-scene is a term frequently used to describe the film-like 
interruptions of game-play that serve as exposition without allowing the 
player’s input. In Geoff King and Tanya Krzywinska’s words, cut-scenes 
are short “audiovisual sequences in which the player usually performs 
the role of more detached observer than is the case in the more active 
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independent (‘cinematic’) camera (Quantic Dream 2010). It is perhaps 
confusing, but important to note, that Dubbelman’s use of ‘third-person 
configuration’ is distinct from ‘third-person camera’ (2013, p. 125). He 
categorizes as ‘semi-first person’ or ‘dual-locus’ what might colloquially 
be named third person play – e.g. in the phrase “Tomb Raider is a first-
person shooter” (Schleiner 2001, p. 222) – whereas Dubbelman’s 
category of ‘third-person configuration’ denotes a “player’s subjective 
point-of-view [entirely] detached from the objective avatar’s body” (cf. 
Dubbelman 2013, p. 118). 
The dual-locus configuration is additionally interesting because it 
presents a shared control over what is traditionally a mode of story-
telling: the “visual narrator” of cinema (Verstraten, 2006, pp. 16-17). 
The visual narrator is an organizing instance that expresses itself 
through camera shots as external focalizer or, when it aligns itself with 
an intradiegetic character, as an internal focalizer. A dual-locus 
configuration puts this task of controlling the camera and indeed of 
focalization fully in the hands of the player. Still, it is valuable to 
recognize the camera as apart from the avatar despite the player’s 
control over both.  
First of all, we must recognize a difference between the two across 
configurations. A clear example of this is the game Resident Evil 3: 
Nemesis (Capcom, 1999), a survival horror game where the player 
controls Special Tactics And Rescue Service (STARS) member Jill 
Valentine, heavily outnumbered by zombies in fictional Raccoon City. 
While the game grants the player disembodied presence as the avatar 
Jill, its static camera angles act as a classical visual narrator. While 
players lead their avatar through the city, the visual narrator adopts a 
fixed camera perspective in a pre-determined corner of each room, 
lurking at the player or slowly following them with its gaze. By contrast, 
opening doors causes a temporary shift in visual narration to a point-of-
view shot aligned with the focalizer  –what Dubbelman calls an 
embodied “first-person avatarial configuration” (2013, p. 104).  
Second of all, games may variably give or take control over each 
separately in certain situations. Uncharted: Drake’s Fortune (Naughty 
Dog, 2007) is a good example of this. Navigating Nathan Drake through 
the Amazon jungle, the camera usually acts as a cinematic visual 
narrator: it points in a direction that progresses the narrative, indicating 
important objects and so on. Whilst action-packed scenes that demand 
360 degrees of attention – ambushes, for example – grant the player 
                                                                                                           
periods of gameplay. Many games use cut-scenes to establish the initial 
setting and background storyline” (2002, p. 11). 
5 A quick-time event is similar to a cut-scene, but one with “a prompt 
[to push a button displayed on-screen] that forces the player to make a 
split- second action or suffer usually painful or fatal consequences” 
(Rogers, 2010, p. 183). 
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full control over the camera in a dual-locus configuration; cinematic cut-
scenes introduce a more autonomous visual narrator – employing cuts, 
reverse shots and other filmic techniques. More importantly, these same 
cut scenes show a similar precariousness of the player’s control over the 
avatar: while control over the camera is often relinquished, cut-scenes 
also temporarily take away the player’s control over the avatar. 
The dual-locus configuration is critically relevant because it establishes a 
clearly variable (dis)embodiedness: although the played subject is 
present as both camera and avatar, one constantly plays through a 
spatial distance to, and difference with, the external avatar. As such, the 
avatar opens up the possibility of gaining its own identity. For this 
reason the dual-locus configuration is dominant in such games such as 
Tomb Raider (Eidos, 1996), Uncharted: Drake’s Fortune and Red Dead 
Redemption (Rockstar San Diego, 2010). Each of these examples leaves 
a clearly identifiable and unambiguous distinction between the avatar as 
a strong narrative character and the player as their ‘puppet-master’. 
Hence, I accept Tomb Raider’s Lara Croft to have a background story; 
Uncharted’s Nathan Drake to take decisions in cinematic interludes that 
I would not take myself; and even for Red Dead’s John Marston to die – 
for him to be replaced by his son as successive avatar. 
The point, of course, is that there lies a possibility of disidentification in 
the distinction that some games create between the player (as playing 
actor and interpreting audience) and the avatar (as the in-game 
representation of the played character). A game that would stay 
consistently within a first-person configuration (thereby never revoking 
my agency) cannot principally have me do things against my will. 
However, most other configurations will break my absolute embodied 
presence at some point. How may we understand that distinction 
between player and character? 
Based on the above, we may conclude that this distinction is above all 
variable and that it is in part dependent on the production of presence 
through formal properties of the game: i.e. coded rules pertaining to the 
player’s influence on point-of-view and control of the avatar. As such, a 
point-of-view and means to navigate the avatar that coincide more with 
each other and are more akin to ‘natural’ (i.e. everyday) bodily 
perception leave a minimum of difference between the player (as 
playing actor and interpreting audience) and the avatar (as the in-game 
representation of the played character). Conversely, a disconnect 
between point-of-view and navigational means lead to a greater 
distinction between the player and character.  
We may add that this co-incidence of player and avatar affects 
identification, provided that we follow Dubbelman’s phenomenological 
argument that perception and physical position are determined by the 
inclination and affordance to act inherent to the environment (pp. 100-
101). As such, when we relinquish our possibility to act (as in cinematic 
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interruptions) or see our intentions represented by the actions of an 
other (as in the dual-locus configuration) our presence gives way to that 
of another that is not us. The greater this distinction is between player 
and character, the less we align with the representation, goals and 
actions of the ‘skin’ we control.  
Concisely, then, the continuum of difference between player and 
character is characterized by a wide scale of formal properties that 
varyingly identifies the player with or differentiates them from their in-
game representation. Both the interpellational model as well as Sicart’s 
concept of the player-subject do not account for this difference. 
Conclusion: the Subject of Play 
It is useful, at this point, to return to my research question regarding 
the type of ideological subject constructed through game-play. It is 
problematic to regard this subject through either an interpellational 
model focusing on a playing subject identified entirely with a played 
subject; or a deconstructivist model focusing on an interpreting subject 
interacting with the game as object (or the ‘subject matter’ of the 
interpreted subject). Rather, Miguel Sicart breaks open these mutually 
exclusive lines of reasoning by proposing a player-subject that is created 
by the game as a ‘skin-subject,’ adopting the avatar of the game as a 
skin in order to perceive the game, in which this player-subject acts 
according to the power structure of the game’s rules. This player-subject 
has an ambiguously defined relation to the player outside of the game, 
of which it is either a subset among multiple subjectivities, or the 
temporary subset of one greater moral being. Additionally, Sicart’s skin-
subject ignores the represented identity of many avatarial ‘skins,’ 
focusing instead on the process of avatar creation in some games as a 
symptom of the skin-subject’s embodiment. 
Teun Dubbelman’s concept of mediated presence allows a theory of the 
relations between the character, the intra- and extradiegetic player. 
Phenomenologically, Dubbelman takes mediated ludic presence as 
another type of perception, delimited by the senses offered by the 
mediatized expression. This presence is furthermore subject to different 
configurations: embodied as if looking through different eyes; or 
disembodied, present as camera and avatar, looking down as we 
navigate. The subject of play is thus one that is essentially ‘split’ across 
the process of game-play. Players are afforded control over this process 
by being granted presence. At the same time, this control is both 
precarious and constrained. Within a limited configuration of presence, 
control over avatar and camera may be relinquished to a (cinematic) 
narrator. The specific configurations and presented content of The 
Stanley Parable comment on that split between the player as an 
audience; the player as an actor; and the player as precarious 
character. The player, thus, is a subject not securely held, equally 
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subject to narration as to its own free autonomy. At once Stanley, and 
controlling Stanley: that is the answer. 
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